Markets have a remarkable capacity for producing efficient resource allocations when information about relative values is dispersed across economic agents. We explore the use of market mechanisms inside the firm to address a resource allocation problem, and compare the outcome with the first-and second-best solution. Although the market mechanism does not always attain the first-best or even second-best benchmark, it is significantly simpler to implement. Moreover, we identify circumstances under which the losses involved in using a market rather than the optimal second-best contract are negligible.
Two key aspects of a firm's management control system are the resource allocation process, and the extent to which the process is supported by the firm's performance evaluation and compensation systems. The importance of these elements is magnified by the fact that, because of size and geographical dispersion, most firms suffer from problems of asymmetric information. In order to assure efficient allocation, a firm must ensure that its performance evaluation/compensation system complements its resource allocation mechanism. The theoretical literature in accounting and economics has viewed this issue as a problem in mechanism design, and has accordingly dealt with it by solving the associated revelation game. The problem is that such solutions, to the extent that they can even be characterized, are complicated and would be expensive to implement.
An alternative is to view the firm as an "economy" and to use the power of markets. Markets have a well-established ability to produce efficient resource allocations within an economy when information about relative values is dispersed across economic agents. 1 Furthermore, markets are easy and inexpensive to implement and maintain relative to more centralized mechanisms. The ability of markets to allocate resources efficiently, coupled with their simplicity, suggests that they may also be an efficient means of allocating resources within firms. 2 One market mechanism whose efficiency properties have been extensively studied is the auction. 3 The purpose of this paper is to study the efficiency of a simple auction mechanism for allocating resources within a firm.
When auctions are considered for allocating a resource within an economy, the value of a resource to each economic agent is generally treated as exogenous. When we consider employing auctions within a firm, however, the value of a resource to each manager is endogenously determined by contractual incentives. Accordingly, we analyze a principal-agent model where the contract terms are set by the principal with knowledge that those terms affect manager behaviors, including 1 See Hayek (1945) , Debreu (1959) , and Arrow (1964) . 2 A prominent example of the use of markets within firms is the practice of transfer pricing to direct transactions among divisions within decentralized firms. There is a vast accounting literature on the theoretical underpinnings and characteristics of transfer pricing systems. A non-representative sample of recent work in this area includes Christensen and Demski (1998) , Baldenius (2000) , Arya and Mittendorf (2004) , and Baldenius and Reichelstein (2006) ; for a current survey of transfer pricing practices, see Ernst & Young (2006) . There is also a considerable theoretical and empirical literature in finance on the use of internal capital markets by firms; see, for example, Lamont (1997) , Stein (1997) , Scharfstein and Stein (2000) , and Gertner et al. (2002) . Taylor (2006) provides an interesting example in which an internal market is used to direct the capital budgeting process.
3 For a survey of the auctions literature see Klemperer (2004) .
bidding behaviors, and resource allocations in a subsequent auction. By employing such a model, we examine the critical role played by a firm's contractual incentives in determining the efficiency of an auction mechanism.
In our model the firm consists of an owner (or principal) and two managers (or agents). Each manager is hired to undertake a separate and independent project. The amount of personal cost incurred by each manager to complete his project is uncertain when he is hired and initiates his project. After each manager privately learns his personal cost to complete his project, the principal uses an auction to allocate a single unit of an indivisible resource to one of the managers. The resource reduces that manager's personal cost to complete his project. After the realization of his cost and the allocation of the resource, each manager decides whether or not to complete his project. As a benchmark, we initially consider the first-best setting where the managers' realized costs are contractible. We then consider how a simple resource allocation mechanism, in the form of an English auction coupled with a fixed completion bonus, performs relative to the first-best.
We restrict the compensation contract to be of this simple form so that the auction mechanism is simple to implement.
We find that the auction mechanism induces the first-best resource allocation and completion decisions when each manager's completion bonus equals his project's completion value to the principal. Hence, when the managers' bonuses fully impound the principal's benefit of project completion, the auction yields efficient resource allocation and project completion decisions. While such outcomes may be socially efficient, they do not maximize the value of the principal's expected utility. In particular, inducing efficient resource allocations of project completion decisions requires that the principal make excessively costly bonus payments.
Of course, the outcome attained in the first-best setting may not be the appropriate benchmark in the presence of private information. Accordingly, we consider as a benchmark the outcome under a second-best direct revelation mechanism (see Myerson (1981) ). As with the second-best direct revelation mechanism under adverse selection, when the principal allocates the resource using the auction mechanism, she chooses the managers' bonuses to trade off the managers' informational rents against the efficiency of the resource allocation and project completion decisions. The optimal trade-off may result in the principal designing the managers' bonuses so that the endogenous value of the resource to each manager (and hence the amount each bids for the resource) is different from the value to the principal of that manager receiving the resource. Thus, even though the auction always results in the manager with the highest endogenous value for the resource winning it, it may not always result in the manager whom the principal would most want to receive the resource getting it. While our auction mechanism is inherently simpler to implement than the second-best direct revelation mechanism, simplicity comes at a cost. We identify a precise set of conditions under which our auction is able to attain the second-best benchmark.
In the model discussed so far, each manager's cost to complete his project was exogenously determined. In Section 4, we address an alternative scenario in which these costs are influenced by investments previously made by each manager (i.e., investments in skill or in cost-reducing activities). Furthermore, the managers' investments are subject to moral hazard (i.e., they are not contractible). In this case, the chosen incentives have an additional role, influencing the managers' investment in skill. We then show that our auction mechanism is generally robust to the presence of this additional incentive problem.
There is a large literature analyzing the efficiency of auctions in the economy. The preponderance of this literature has analyzed the allocative efficiency of different types of auctions when the bidders are privately informed as to their valuations for the resource and those valuations are exogenously specified. In contrast, as noted earlier, when auctions are used within the firm to allocate resources, the bidders' valuations of the resource are influenced by their job duties and compensation. Thus, the principal in choosing the managers' compensation contracts must consider the effect that the contracts have on their valuations, their bids, and the resulting resource allocation and project completion.
There are two branches of the extant auctions literature that consider endogenous bidder valuations for a resource. The first examines the effect additional information has on a bidder's valuation, the incentives for a bidder to release that information, and the incentives for a bidder to gather additional information (see Milgrom and Weber (1982) and Bergemen and Valimaki (2006) for a survey of the literature). The second examines the implications of changing the payment made by the winning bidder. For example, in the case of an auction for natural resource extraction rights, the winning bidder could pay his bid plus a royalty on the resources extracted (e.g., see Riley (1988)) in lieu of just paying his bid. Closest to our work is that by Laffont and Tirole (1987) . 4 They examine the auctioning of incentive contracts, as in a procurement setting. There are a number of differences between their paper and ours. In Laffont and Tirole (1987) , the job itself is auctioned off whereas, in our model, the agents are assigned the job ex ante and a help resource is auctioned off. Further, the agents take actions after the auction in their model, while the agents take actions before as well as after the auction in section 4 of our paper. Perhaps the most important difference is that Laffont and Tirole (1987) assume that compensation can vary in the bids and the realized project cost, thus enabling them to separate the auction design from the incentive contract design.
In contrast, we restrict attention to simple auctions with fixed completion bonuses. Our analysis is thus in the spirit of recent work (see, for example, Rogerson (2003) and Chu and Sappington (2005) ) that seeks to examine the efficiency of mechanisms that are easy to implement and that impose lower informational requirements than the fully optimal, complex solution to the mechanism design problem.
The Model
Our model consists of a risk-neutral principal and two risk-neutral managers, 1 and 2. The principal contracts with each manager to work on independent projects. At the time the principal and managers contract, each manager is uncertain as to the personal cost he must incur to complete his project. Once each managers' project is underway, each manager learns his cost to complete his project. In particular, manager i learns that his cost is 1 − z i , where z i is the realization of a uniformly distributed random variablez i with (normalized) support [0,1];z 1 andz 2 are independent and identically distributed. 5 The principal has available an indivisible resource which, if allocated to a manager, reduces that manager's cost to complete his project. If manager i is allocated the resource, his cost to complete the project is reduced to (1 − β)(1 − z i ) where β ∈ [0, 1] and is publicly known. Additionally, we assume that the managers are constrained in their wealth, and hence the firm cannot "sell" the benefits of the tasks directly to the managers. Moreover, mangers are free to leave the firm at any time, and must thus receive their reservation payoff of zero if the principal wants them to stay with the firm and complete their projects. Finally, the firm obtains a benefit B > 0 if a project is completed (i.e., if both projects are completed, the firm receives 2B) and a benefit of 0 if it is not completed.
Benchmark
As a benchmark, consider the first-best case where the project completions and realizations z 1 and z 2 are observable and contractible. Let z denote the minimum element of {z 1 , z 2 } and z denote the maximum element of {z 1 , z 2 }. Table 1 provides the first-best resource allocation decisions, 5 In Section 4, we allow manager i to improve the distribution of zi through costly investment.
completion decisions, and compensation levels for each possible {z 1 , z 2 }. 
To understand the conditions, note first that it is always optimal to allocate the resource to the project that will be completed and has the largest cost to complete (lowest z) realization. It follows that the resource should be allocated to the manager with realization z if both projects are to be completed. However, if only one project is to be completed, it is optimal to complete the project with realization z and allocate the resource to that project. Given these two observations, the first column of the first row specifies the condition under which completion of both projects dominates the completion of just the most profitable project (i.e., the project associated with the larger z, z). If this condition is satisfied, completion of both projects also dominates completion of neither project. The first column of the second row contains the condition under which the completion of just the most profitable project dominates the completion of both projects and the completion of neither project. The first column of the third row contains the condition for the completion of neither project to dominate the completion of just the most profitable project. If this condition is satisfied, completion of neither project also dominates completion of both projects.
The compensation in each case is the amount necessary to satisfy each manager's minimum utility constraint.
Analysis of The Auction Mechanism
As pointed out in the Introduction, simple auction mechanisms have proven to be efficient ways to allocate resources when information within economies is dispersed across agents. To assess how well an auction works within the context under consideration, we consider a sealed bid English auction for allocating the resource coupled with a contractual payment that is conditioned on whether or not a manager completes his project. Under the English auction mechanism, the manager with the higher bid acquires the resource and has the lower bid, denoted p, deducted from his compensation.
We restrict attention to symmetric contracts and let c denote the bonus a manager receives if he completes his project. Given that the managers are unable to ex ante commit to stay with the firm for the entire game, the optimal fixed component of compensation is 0. Hence, we do not incorporate a fixed component of compensation into the managers' contracts.
In order to facilitate the characterization of the optimal contract and the resulting allocations, we first assess how the managers behave for a given bonus, c. We assume that the managers play the unique symmetric Nash equilibrium, which has the property that each manager's dominant strategy is to bid his personal valuation for the resource. Agent i's valuation for the resource is given by v i (z i ):
Notice that the manager's valuation function is non-monotonic in his cost realization, z i . The reason is that a manager with a realization of z i < 1 − c 1−β will not complete the task, even if he is awarded the resource. On the other hand, a manager with 1 − c 1−β ≤ z i < 1 − c will complete the project only if he is awarded the resource. Finally, a manager with z i ≥ 1 − c will always complete his project. We refer to the former managers (z i < 1 − c) as budget constrained and the latter (z i ≥ 1 − c) as budget unconstrained. A budget constrained manager's value for the resource is c − (1 − β)(1 − z) because this is the incremental benefit he obtains from the resource and completing the project as opposed to not completing the project. A budget unconstrained manager's value for the resource is β(1 − z i ) because this is the incremental benefit he obtains from receiving the resource and completing the project as opposed to completing the project without the resource. Finally, a manager with z < 1 − c 1−β would not complete his project even if he were given the resource. Therefore, he assigns zero value to the resource. Figure 1 graphically illustrates a manager's bidding strategy as a function of the manager's cost realization.
The single-peaked valuation function in Figure 1 drives the efficiency losses associated with our internal auction mechanism. In the traditional auction literature, each manager bids based on his exogenously endowed value for the resource. Further, his optimal bidding strategy is monotonic in his value and, as a result, the resource is always allocated efficiently ex ante because the manager who values the resource the most always bids the most and wins it. In our mechanism, as in Lastly, a manager with draw z i < 1− c 1−β will never complete his project, even with help, and hence values the resource at zero dollars. the traditional auction, each manager's bid is monotonic in his value, which is determined by his exogenous cost realization and the endogenous completion bonus. Furthermore, the manager who values the resource the most always wins the resource. However, the resource allocation may not be ex ante efficient because efficiency is defined from the principal's perspective and is determine solely by the cost realizations. Hence the resource may not always be allocated efficiently under our auction mechanism.
To illustrate the efficiency loss attributable to the auction mechanism, assume that for realization {z 1 , z 2 } it would be desirable for each manager to complete his project. In that case the resource should be allocated to the manager with the higher cost (i.e. lower z realization). The manager with the higher cost, however, will not necessarily bid a higher value in the auction because he may simply forego completion if he loses the auction. From Figure 1 , note that if manager 1 receives a draw z 1 = x and manager 2 receives z 2 = y , and in equilibrium each manager bids his value, manager 2 will be awarded the resource and manager 1 will not complete his project, despite the fact that both managers would have completed their project had manager 1 been awarded the resource.
Of course, the behavior of each manager is determined by his compensation so the potential for the auction to fail to allocate the resource efficiently and induce efficient completion can be mitigated through the principal's choice of the contract parameter, c. Initially, we assess how the first-best completion and allocation outcome relates to the contract. The following table provides the resource allocation and completion strategies for each possible {z 1 , z 2 } under the auction mechanism. 
The most telling observation of the table is that the resource allocation and product completion strategies are "identical" to those in the first-best setting except that the contract bonus parameter c, replaces the benefit of completion to the firm, B. Hence, the auction mechanism allocates the resource and induces the completion decisions that are efficient for the two managers given their contract parameters, but this need not be the efficient outcome for the principal. Indeed, the resource allocation and completion decisions replicate those of the first-best if and only if the manager's bonus (i.e., completion benefit), c, equals the firm's completion benefit, B.
The Optimal Bonus
The analysis above implies that the efficiency of the resource allocation and completion decisions induced with the internal auction mechanism can achieve the first-best if the firm gives the "right" bonus incentive to the managers. Of course, the principal does not care about the ex-ante efficiency of the resource allocations and completion decisions when devising the optimal bonus; she cares only about her own expected profits. Hence, setting c = B to induce efficient resource allocations and completion decisions may not be optimal.
The principal's ex ante payoff is determined by three components: the expected completion benefits, the expected auction revenues, and the expected completion bonus payments. To facilitate the process of solving for the optimal bonus, it is useful to assess each of these components and identify how each varies explicitly or implicitly in the bonus c. Consider first the expected completion benefits, which equals the expected number of projects completed times the completion benefit B. If c = 1, any type of manager will complete his project, even without help. In fact the same is true for any bonus coefficient c greater than 1. Clearly, as c decreases below 1, an increasing number of managers will not complete their task without help, and for c < 1 − β, managers with an exceedingly high cost of completing their project will not complete their task, even if awarded the resource. From Figure 1 , it is clear that increasing c (when c < 1) causes the increasing portion of
, to decrease which, in turn, increases the expected number of projects completed. More formally, we have the following lemma.
Lemma 1
The expected number of projects completed under the auction mechanism with completion bonus c is:
CP is increasing in c.
Proof: Let P 2 denote the probability of completing both projects, and similarly P 1 and P 0 denote the probability of completing one project and no projects, respectively. Under the auction mechanism, we can write:
The expression for CP and its monotonicity follow directly from the expressions above. We will present the analysis in full generality so that the results derived in this section can be reused in Section 4 in which the managers can affect their cost realizations by their earlier cost-reducing activities. Assume that the density of manager i's cost realization z i is given by f (z i , e i ) = (2 − 2z i )(1 − e i ) + e i , where e i denotes manager i's choice of effort (i.e. e i ≡ 1 until Section 4). 6 We will define F (z i , e i ) to be the corresponding cumulative distribution function. If c ≥ 1, then both managers will always find it profitable to complete their projects, because their payoff for completion c always exceeds their cost of completion.
Next, suppose 1 − β ≤ c < 1. Now a manager will always complete his task if he receives the resource (by construction), and hence, assuming the principal always offers the resource to one of the managers, the probability of no tasks being completed is zero. On the other hand, the probability that both managers complete their projects is given by the probability that both managers are budget unconstrained (z i > 1 − c for i = 1, 2) plus the probability that only one manager is budget constrained, yet values the resource more than the unconstrained manager.
Formally, the probability of both tasks being completed, which we denote by P 2(·), is given by:
Notice that is ei = 1, then the cost distribution is uniform over the interval [0, 1] .
Here, Z(s) is the type of budget unconstrained manager that values the resource as much as a budget constrained manager with cost realization s. 7 In particular,
Letting P 2(e 1 , e 2 , β, c) denote the probability that both tasks are completed given that manager 1 puts forth effort e 1 and manager 2 works e 2 , we can solve (2) to obtain:
Setting e 1 = e 2 = 1 in (3), the probability of both tasks being completed when 1 − β ≤ c < 1
Finally, if c < 1−β, then we are no longer assured that a manager who receives help will complete his task (see Figure 1 ). In particular, if z i < 1 − c 1−β , then a manager will not complete his task, regardless of whether the resource is allocated to him or not. In this instance, the probability of both tasks being completed is given by:
Note that the integral in (4) is identical to that of (2), except that the bounds of integration are changed to reflect the fact that not all managers will complete their tasks in the presence of the resource. Solving for (4), we obtain:
Again, assuming e 1 = e 2 = 1 in (5), when c < 1 − β, we can write P 2(1, 1, β, c) = c 2 1−β . Rather than solve directly for P 1, we instead solve for P 0, and obtain P 1 = 1 − P 0 − P 2. Neither manager will complete his project if both have a realization z ∈ 0, 1 − c 1−β , hence we can write:
When e 1 = e 2 = 1, P 0 reduces to 1 − Lemma 2 The principal's expected revenues from allocating the resource under the auction mechanism with completion bonus c:
.
ER is increasing in c.
Proof: In a second price auction, the principal's expected revenue is given by the expected secondorder statistic. To facilitate the proof, we make a change of variables from the managers' types, z i , to their valuations, v i (z i ). The distribution of the managers' values when c < 1 − β is different from the distribution when c ≥ 1 − β, because in the former case, a mass exists at the zero valuation (because in this case, managers with z i ∈ [0, 1 − c 1−β ] value the resource at zero). We begin with the case where 1 > c ≥ 1 − β, which corresponds to the dotted line in figure 2. Let g(v, e i ) denote the density of manager i's value for the resource after taking action e i , then from the valuations found in (1) we can write:
The split in the distribution of values reflects the fact that when c ≥ 1 − β, the budget constrained and budget unconstrained managers share a limited set of values. Note that only budget unconstrained managers will have values less than or equal to c + β − 1, whereas both types of managers can have valuations between c + β − 1 and cβ.
We can calculate the cumulative distribution functions from (6) as:
Solving, we have:
Because the expected revenue is given by the expected second order statistic of the managers' values, we can use standard formulas for the second-order statistic using the cumulative distribution function to obtain:
Solving, we find that:
If both managers work (e 1 = e 2 = 1), then ER(1, 1, c) =
when 1 − β < c ≤ 1. When c > 1, the managers' valuations follow the thin line in figure 2 where both managers always finish their projects (as in the case of c = 1). Hence, when c > 1, the bonus parameter, c, does not play any role in either the probability of finishing or the value either manager attaches to winning the resource (beyond the case where c = 1). Now, when c < 1 − β, both types of managers can have valuations between 0 and cβ, as the boldface line indicates in figure 2. However, there exists a mass of types with value 0. We can thus write the density of values as:
¿From (8), we can write down the cumulative distribution function:
We can now solve for the expected revenue as follows:
Note that the expected revenue calculation above omits the calculation at the mass v = 0 because whenever at least one manager values the resource at zero, the other manager will obtain the resource free of charge. In the present setting where where e 1 = e 2 = 1, we have ER(e 1 , e 2 ) = will not complete their project even if they receive the resource whereas managers with an increasing valuation will only complete their project if they receive the resource. For 1 − β < c < 1, a manager's value for the resource is given by the dotted curve, and again, managers with an increasing valuation will only complete their task if they receive help.
Finally, managers' valuations for c ≥ 1 is given by the thin curve and in this case all managers are willing to complete their project, regardless of whether they are awarded the resource or not.
The previous two lemmas indicate that increases in c can increase the principal's welfare through two avenues. First, increases in c increase the expected number of projects completed, which increases the expected completion benefits. Second, increases in c increase the revenues obtained from the auction. Of course, the principal cannot increase his welfare by raising c indefinitely because c also determines the expected completion bonus the principal must pay each manager.
The expected completion bonus equals the expected number of projects completed multiplied by c.
It follows that the expected completion bonus increases directly in c and, from Lemma 1, indirectly in c through the effect of c on the expected number of projects completed. Hence, the optimal c must trade off the benefit of a higher c on the first two components, the expected completion benefits and the expected auction revenues, against the cost of a higher c on the third component, the expected bonus payments. A formal analysis of this trade-off yields Proposition 1.
Proposition 1 The owner's optimal choice of c is given by:
Proof: Let π cb denote the principal's total expected profits. Furthermore, for the time being, assume that c ≥ 1 − β and therefore the principal wishes to guarantee that a manager who receives the resource will complete his task. Then we can write:
Note that π cb is a cubic in c, and the coefficient of c 3 is positive. The two solutions to Recall that the restriction c ≥ 1 − β was imposed to insure that any manager who receives help finishes his task. It is clearly optimal to request that this hold when B ≥ 2(1 − β), but may not be the case when B < 2(1 − β). As such, we will now drop the earlier assumption that the principal requires any recipient of the resource to complete his project, and solve for the optimal completion bonus c. In this setting, as long as c ∈ [0, 1 − β), the principal maximizes:
The cubic has two extreme points, c = By assumption, we must have c ∈ [0, 1 − β), and if B/2 is a candidate solution, it must be the case
The optimal payment c * is continuous in B and β, however the induced behavior of the managers is vastly different when B < 2(1 − β) and B ≥ 2(1 − β). When B < 2(1 − β), it is not worthwhile to the principal for a sufficiently "bad" type manager to complete his project, even if awarded help.
In Figure 1 note that types z i < 1 − c 1−β will not complete their tasks even if awarded help, as (1 − z i )(1 − β) > c. On the other hand, when B ≥ 2(1 − β), the optimal bonus c * is sufficiently large that any type of manager z i will complete his task if assigned the resource.
As indicated by Proposition 1, the optimal bonus is always set below that which implements the first-best resource allocation and completion decisions (c = B). As a consequence, we have Corollary 1.
Corollary 1 For any cost realization, {z 1 , z 2 }, the number of projects completed in the first-best setting exceeds the number of projects completed when the auction mechanism is employed.
A direct implication of Corollary 1 is that the auction mechanism leads to poor follow-through on projects relative to the first-best case. With respect to resource allocations, Corollary 1 also implies that, under the auction mechanism and its associated optimal completion bonus, there exist cost realizations where the firm would like to override the auction outcome and allocate the resource to the losing manager. Consider, for example, the case where B < 2(1 − β), hence c = B/2, and the cost realization is one in which 1 − z < c < 1 − z < c/(1 − β) and β(1 − z) > c − (1 − β)(1 − z). In this case, the manager with the low cost realization, z, wins the auction and pays c − (1 − β)(1 − z). Further, only the low cost manager completes the project. Given that outcome, the firm would prefer to nullify the auction, refund the payment to the low cost manager, and simply give the resource to the high cost manager. Why? Doing so decreases the auction revenues by c − (1 − β)(1 − z) = B 2 − (1 − β)(1 − z) and, by inducing the high cost manager to also complete the project, increases the net completion benefit by B − c = B/2 > B/2 − (1 − β)(1 − z).
In summary, the auction mechanism fails to induce first-best efficient allocations of the resource and the completion decisions.
Comparative Statics
Having compared the outcomes attained under the auction mechanism to those attained in the firstbest setting, we turn next to understanding how characteristics of the optimal auction mechanism change in response to changes in the exogenous parameters.
Corollary 2 When the auction mechanism is employed, the optimal bonus is increasing in the completion benefit and decreasing in the return to the resource:
Intuitively, the optimal bonus increases in the benefit of completion to the firm because increasing the bonus makes it more likely that the manager will complete the project. In addition, the bonus is decreasing in the return to the help resource, β . The intuition underlying this comparative static is that increases in the productivity of the resource naturally make the value of the resource greater for each manager. Hence, it takes a smaller completion bonus to induce the managers to complete the project with help, which allows the firm to retain a larger fraction of the total surplus.
The Second-Best Direct Revelation Mechanism
In many cases we expect that managers have private information about their operating unit. In these cases, the first-best is an inappropriate benchmark. Instead, the appropriate benchmark is the outcome attained under the optimal second-best direct revelation mechanism. In this section, we derive the outcomes attained under such an optimal second-best contract, and then compare these outcomes with those attained by the optimal auction mechanism.
In deriving the optimal contract for the second best case we assume that each manager must attain a reservation level expected utility conditional upon their type realization of 0. Let x i (z i , z −i ) ≥ 0 denote the payment made to manager i conditional upon i reporting a cost of z i and the other manager reporting a cost of z −i , k i (z i , z −i ) be 0 or 1 depending upon whether manager i is required to complete the project conditional upon the two reports, and p i (z i , z −i ) be the probability that manager i receives help conditional upon the two reports. Then principal's optimal contracting problem solves:
subject to:
The first constraint is the ex-post reservation constraint, the second is the truth-telling constraint, the third and fourth are constraints on the probabilities, and the fifth is the nonnegativity constraint on manager compensation.
Second-Best Resource Allocation and Completion Decisions
Below, we characterize the optimal second-best solution. Again, we let z denote the minimum element of the realization {z 1 , z 2 } and z denote the maximum element of {z 1 , z 2 }.
Proposition 2 Under any second-best contract the resource is allocated to the manager with the highest cost that is required to complete his project: p i (z i , z −i ) = 1 if and only if z i = z and k i (z i , z −i ) = 1 or z i = z and k −i (z i , z −i ) = 0. Furthermore, manager i is asked to complete his project if and only if B ≥ 2(1 − z i )(1 − βp i (z i , z −i )).
Proof:
We first prove two lemmas which are useful in the proof of the proposition.
Lemma 3 Any incentive compatible set (k(z), p(z), x(z)) must satisfy the following:
Proof: Truth-telling mandates that:
Summing the pair yields:
is non-positive, i.e.
Lemma 4 
The second term on the r.h.s. is zero if local IC holds, so applying the Fundamental Theorem of Calculus to the FOC yields:
Which by definition of π i can be written as:
Note that this fixes manager i's expected payment conditional on observing z i . If we define x i (z) as the term inside the brackets above, then x i (z) ≥ 0 ∀z such that the manager is at worst indifferent to finishing if he is asked to (i.e. not just in expectation). The fact that π i (0) = 0 is optimal can be seen by assuming the contrary, say π i (0) > 0, then noting that we can reduce each manager's compensation by π i (0) and the schedule will continue to satisfy both IC and IR.
We can now prove the proposition. Integration by parts allows us to rewrite
Therefore using Lemma 4 we can re-write the Principal's problem as:
Because we are using the uniform density over [0, 1] we can replace
f (z i ) with 1 − z i allowing us to rewrite (11) as:
¿From (12), it is obvious that the principal will set p i (z i , z −i ) = 1 to the manager with k(z i , z −i ) = 1 and the smallest value of z i , otherwise p i (z i , z −i ) = 0. The principal will set k i (z i , z −i ) = 1 whenever doing so maximizes the integrant in (12), i.e. when B/2 ≥ β(1 − z)
(1 − β)(1 − z), the manager with the highest realization z, is asked to complete the project, and finally in all other cases, the principal prefers for both managers not to complete their projects.
Hence, the monotonicity requirements from Lemma 3 are satisfied.
We can employ the conditions in Proposition 2 to summarize the second-best resource allocation and completion decisions in a manner that facilitates comparison with those of the first-best and those attained under the auction mechanism. 
The resource allocation and completion table in the second-best setting is the same as that in the first-best setting except for the first column, where the B/2 expressions in Table 3 are replaced with B in Table 1 . Table 3 halves the benefit relative to the first-best setting, because in the second-best setting, the principal must pay the managers informational rents which effectively doubles their individual cost of completing each project. In particular, when the principal decides which projects should go forward, he faces the so-called virtual-cost, which in this case, is double each manager's true cost of completing his project. Because the managers' virtual costs exceed their costs in the first best setting, the principal optimally asks that fewer projects be completed. This observation that the firm foregoes completed projects to induce revelation in a less costly manner is consistent with the general adverse selection literature.
What is of particular interest here is a comparison of the resource allocation and completion decisions under our auction mechanism with those under the second-best contract. Proposition 1, coupled with Tables 2 and 3 , yield Corollary 3.
Corollary 3 If B ≤ 2(1 − β), the resource allocation and completion decisions in the secondbest are replicated with the optimal auction mechanism. If B > 2(1 − β), the number of projects completed for any cost realization, {z 1 , z 2 }, in the second-best setting exceeds the number of projects completed when the auction mechanism is employed.
Corollary 3 implies that the auction mechanism replicates the resource allocations and completion decisions attained under a second-best contract in cases where the completion benefit is small or the returns to the resource are small. This observation may appear surprising in light of our analysis of the auction mechanism, which suggested inherent resource allocation inefficiencies arising from the bidding behavior in the auction. The corollary demonstrates that even the secondbest mechanism incorporates such inefficiencies to minimize the informational rents earned by the managers. However, in other cases, the auction mechanism fails to replicate the second-best resource allocation and completion decisions. Instead, fewer projects are completed with the market mechanism than would be under a second-best mechanism.
The fact that the auction mechanism replicates the second-best resource allocation and project completion decisions when B ≤ 2(1 − β) suggests that the auction mechanism may attain the second-best benchmark in some cases. The following proposition demonstrates that this in indeed the case.
Proposition 3 The auction mechanism attains the benchmark second-best level of performance if and only if B ≤ 2(1 − β) .
We begin by calculating the principal's expected surplus in the second-best setting.
Recall that from (12), the principal's expected payment to each manager is given by two times the manager's cost. The probability of both managers finishing their tasks times the principal's payoff when two tasks are finished is given by:
To simplify the exposition, in the two expressions above, z again denotes the larger of the two z i draws, and z the smaller of the two. The integrals in (13) and (14) are pre-multiplied by 2 because either manager 1 or manager 2 could receive the smaller cost realization z. Although when both managers are asked to complete their projects, the manager with the greatest cost (1 − z)
is always awarded the resource, the integral in (13) refers to the case where 1 − z is sufficiently small that regardless of the other manager's cost realization B/2 ≥ β(1 − z)
i.e. from Table 3 , the two managers will always be asked to complete their tasks. On the other hand, the integral in (14) i.e. the cost boundary where both managers are asked to complete their tasks. The sum of (13) and (14) is given by
12(1−β) . On the other hand, the probability of a single manager completing his task times the payoff to the principal under the second-best is given by:
Again, z denotes the larger of the two draws. Recall that only one manager is asked to complete his project whenever the second entry in the first column of Table 3 holds. The second integral in (15) is the complement to the second integral in (14), i.e. the bounds insure that the entry in the first row and column of Table 3 is violated, and instead, the second row of the first column holds.
The first integral in (16) is the complement to the first integral in (14) in that it allows the smaller of the two cost realizations to belong to an interval which would never satisfy the first row and column of Table 3 . The second integral in (16) simply limits the larger of the two cost realizations such that the principal is assured that at least one task is accomplished, i.e. it limits the larger of the two realization to satisfy (
The sum of (15) and (16) is given by
. Summing the expected payoffs times their respective probabilities yields the principal's total expected payoff which is given by:
We now turn to the principal's expected payoff using the market mechanism. Plugging in the optimal completion bonus c = B/2 into the principal's objective function (10) yields (17).
Note that the second-best regime allocates the resource, determines which projects are completed and compensates the employees as a function of the two announcements made. 8 The auction mechanism, in contrast, does not have the same degrees of freedom to establish state contingent pay-offs. Instead, the auction mechanism uses the two announcements (i.e., the bids) to determine who should be allocated the resource and how much the winner should pay for the resource. A fixed bonus c is then employed to motivate the managers in their bidding and project completion decisions. Surprisingly, even with the disadvantage of fewer degrees of freedom, the auction mechanism manages to attain the second-best benchmark when the principal's benefit B and the helpfulness of the resource β are limited (i.e., B ≤ 2(1 − β)).
Unfortunately, for larger values of B and β (i.e., B > 2(1 − β)) the auction mechanism does not attain the second-best benchmark. For large values of B, the principal decides not to pay B/2 as a completion bonus, because the bonus becomes exceedingly large. Instead, the principal opts for a smaller bonus of c * < B/2. The lowered bonus, in turn, implies fewer projects will be completed with the auction mechanism relative to the second-best mechanism.
Because the auction mechanism fails to achieve the second-best when B > 2(1 − β), it is worthwhile to assess how the exogenous factors in the model, B and β, affect the opportunity loss from using the auction mechanism rather than a full-blown second-best mechanism.
Proposition 4 If B > 2(1 − β), the value of the principal's objective under the second-best less the value under the auction mechanism is increasing in B and β.
Proof: Following the proof technique of the prior proposition, we begin with the principal's expected payoff from the second-best regime. If both managers complete their tasks, the principal's expected payoff is given by: 9
Similarly, if only a single manager completes his task, then the principal's expected payoff in the second-best setting is given by:
Summing (18) and (19), we obtain the principal's expected payoff which is given by:
9 Note that the integrants in this proof mirror those in the proof of Proposition 3, however the bounds of integration change because now B > 2(1 − β).
Similarly, the principal's payoff using the auction mechanism is derived by plugging in the optimal completion bonus c * = 1 4 3 + B − (B − 1) 2 + 8β into the principal's objective function (9) yields:
The difference between the principal's payoff in the second-best setting (20) and the auction mechanism (21) is given by:
To see that D(B, β) is increasing in B, note that:
The expression ∂D ∂B has two zeroes in B: 2(1 − β) and 
The expression (23) is always zero when B = 2(1 − β), and we plot the expression over the range B > 2(1 − β) in Figure 3 , which demonstrates that the expression is in fact always positive in the range 2(1 − β) ≤ B ≤ 2. (23) with the irrelevant region (B < 2(1 − β)) set equal to zero. Clearly, in the relevant region, the expression is positive.
Under the second-best, an increase in B or β causes the principal to induce completion for more state realizations due to the increased direct return to completion, captured by B, or the decreased cost of completion, captured by β. In order for the auction mechanism to replicate the second-best resource allocation and completion decisions, the completion bonus paid to the managers must be given by c = B/2. For large values of B, however, paying the managers B/2 to replicate the second-best resource allocation and completion decisions is too costly because the expected payments received in the auction plus the expected returns from completion are insufficient to cover the greater expected compensation. Instead, the principal optimally pays the managers c = 1 4 3 + B − (B − 1) 2 + 8β < B/2 in lieu of B/2. The extent of this deviation from the second-best is increasing in B and β, and, as a consequence, the auction mechanism falls farther from the second-best when B or β increase.
As an example, Figure 4 plots the efficiency of the auction mechanism relative to the second-best mechanism. The graphs only plot the relative efficiency of the auction mechanism for B > 2(1 − β), because the auction mechanism attains the second-best benchmark when B ≤ 2(1 − β).
Moral Hazard in Cost Reduction
To this point we have considered a scenario in which the managers are exogenously endowed with their cost to complete realizations. We now shift to a scenario where each manager can initially expend effort that affects the distribution of his type z i . Managers may be able to influence the cost of their projects via ex-ante activities such as research, planning or improved search. In particular,
we assume that manager i can take action e i where e i ∈ {0, 1} and that action affects the probability distribution over the cost to complete his project. Without loss of generality, suppose the cost to taking action e i = 0 is zero and the manager incurs disutility ν when he selects e i = 1. As before, we will assume that manger i realizes a cost of 1 − z i to finish his project. However we now assume the distribution of z i is related to the manager's choice of effort e i in the following way:
Thus, z i is uniformly distributed over [0, 1] if e i = 1. If e i = 0, the the support for z i is still [0, 1], but the marginal density is increasing in z i .
When the manager picks e i = 0, we shall say that he has taken no effort, and when he chooses e i = 1 we shall say that he has exerted effort. We continue to assume that each manager privately observes his own cost to complete. Moreover, each manager's action e i is unobserved by the principal and the other manager, and is subject to moral hazard. Finally, we continue to assume the managers are free to leave the firm at any time, and hence, each manager must always receive a level of utility at least as large as that offered by their outside option, which is 0.
The second-best benchmark contract changes in this setting because the principal's preference over e 1 and e 2 must be considered. We will assume that the principal prefers e 1 = e 2 = 1, which implicitly imposes an upper limit on ν, each manager's cost of effort. Thus, the only difference between this section and the preceding one is that the principal must now motivate the managers to expend effort in reducing their anticipated completion costs.
We begin by examining manager i's preferences over e i in the auction mechanism. Managers face two countervailing incentives with respect to their choice of e i . By exerting effort, manager i increases his probability of getting a large z i . A large z i , in turn, increases the probability that the manager completes his project and secures the completion bonus c. By exerting no effort, manager i increases the probability that he will receive the rents associated with obtaining the help resource.
Thus, each manager must balance the advantage of exerting effort -increasing the probability of completing the project and receiving the bonus c-versus the disadvantage of exerting effortcompleting the project without the cost reducing resource. The following lemma characterizes the incentives facing for each manager to exert effort as a function of the other manager's choice of effort.
Lemma 5 Agent i's incentive to exert effort is decreasing in manager −i's effort.
Proof: Let s(e i , e −i ) denote manager i's, ex-ante expected surplus from taking action e i when the other manager picks effort e −i . Agent i's surplus is thus given by:
−e −i (7β 3 + (1 − c) 4 (11 + 4c) + 2β(c − 1) 3 (9 + 7c + 4c 2 )) −e i (10β 2 − 3β 3 + (1 − c) 4 (11 + 4c) + 2β(c − 1) 3 (9 + 7c + c 2 ))
To find the expected surplus of each manager, we proceed in two steps. We first find the manager's expected payoff c minus the cost of effort, and in the second step, we subtract the manager's expected payment. 
To obtain each manager's expected surplus, we first sum the expected values in the table above and use the probabilities previously computed in the proof of Lemma 1 to obtain:
Using the cumulative distribution of values, G(·), from Lemma 2, we can calculate the expected payment as: cβ 0 sg(s, e −i )(1 − G(s, e i ))ds and can subtract it from (25) to obtain the manager's expected surplus s(e i , e −i ) in (24). Now, we can characterize the cross partial:
It remains to be shown that (26) is negative. To this end, note that we can disregard the denominator of (26). The numerator of (26) is clearly concave in β, hence we can solve for the maximizing value of β via the first order approach to obtainβ = (1 − c) 2 3 (1 + c + 2c 2 )(1 − c). Clearly, whenβ > 1, β = 1 maximizes the numerator of (26) over the feasible region β ∈ [0, 1]. Figure 5 plots the the numerator of (26) over c with the maximizing value of β, which bounds the numerator of (26) from above. Because the plot in Figure 5 is non-positive, so is (26). The proof to Lemma 24 shows that manager i's preference for shirking increases as the other manager works. To understand why, recall that the resource is awarded to the manager with the highest cost to completion, conditional on the manager choosing to complete his project. As such, if manager −i works, the probability of manager i being awarded the resource increases if he decides to shirk. The only countervailing force to induce the manager i to work, is the opportunity to earn rents upon completing a project, i.e. the probability of completing a project increases if manager i works.
To further simplify the analysis, let N (β, c, ν) = s(1, 1) − s(0, 1) − ν, the marginal surplus or loss a manager obtains by exerting effort assuming that the other manager is exerting effort as well. If N (β, c, ν) is positive, both managers exerting effort is a Nash equilibrium. For sufficiently large values of ν, however, the principal will be unable to motivate both manager's to exert effort regardless of c. This follows from the fact that the manager will opt to incur more expected costs ex post (i.e., a higher expected z i ) in lieu of incurring higher costs ex ante (i.e., incurring ν). As shown in the following proposition, when ν is sufficiently small, the principal will be able to induce {e 1 , e 2 } = {1, 1} as a Nash equilibrium for a sufficiently large completion bonus, c.
Proposition 5 For sufficiently small ν, the principal can induce e 1 = e 2 = 1 to be a Nash equilibrium by setting c ≥ĉ(β, ν). Moreover:
Proof: We can write N (β, c, ν) as:
The equation When the completion bonus exceeds the thresholdĉ(β, ν), each manager prefers effort to no effort; although exerting no effort increases the probability that the manager will win the resource; it also increases the probability that the manager does not finish his project and forfeits the bonus c.
The analysis to this point begs the question: Will the no-moral-hazard optimal completion bonus ever be sufficiently large to motivate effort? The following example demonstrates the possibility of c * being sufficiently large to motivate effort.
Example: Suppose the Principal earns B = 3/2 dollars for the completion of either project.
Moreover, suppose the resource would cut either manager's cost in half, that is β = 1/2. The optimal bonus without moral hazard is given by √ 17) ≈ 0.10082, the manager will find it worthwhile to work hard in order to improve his chances of obtaining a low cost (large z). On the other hand, for ν > 0.1, the principal must increase the size of the bonus in order to motivate the manager.
As the example shows, the no-moral-hazard contract may offer sufficient rents to induce the managers to engage in costly effort to lower their expected completion costs. To get a better handle as to when effort can be induced at no incremental cost, we exploit some properties of N (β, c, ν).
In the proof to Proposition 5, N (β, c, ν) is shown to be minimized at c = 1−β 1+2β . Hence, if effort is implemented as a Nash equilibrium when c * > 1−β 1+2β , as is always the case when B ≥ 2(1 − β), then any upward shock to the principal's project completion benefit B will result in a new bonus, c * , which will again implement effort by both managers in a Nash equilibrium. Similarly, if B < 2(1 − β) and c * < 1−β 1+2β , if c * motivates managers to exert effort, then the managers will continue to exert effort following any revision of the bonus, c * , following a downward shock to the principal's completion benefit B.
Characterizing the optimal second-best solution to this problem would be very complicated. If the second-best mechanism without moral hazard does not induce the managers to exert effort, then the principal must increase the rents paid to the managers with high type realizations, as those realizations are more likely to be the product of the manager having exerted effort. Further, the principal would have to determine whether or not to alter the quantity of projects completed. 10
Although previous work has considered moral hazard alongside adverse selection, in these models the moral hazard does not alter the managers' private information. Without a second-best benchmark to compare our auction mechanism, we are unable to assess the efficiency loss associated with the use of our auction mechanism. Instead, we spend the remainder of this section characterizing the optimal auction mechanism when the managers' efforts influence their type realizations.
Proposition 5 established that for a suitably large completion bonus c, the principal can make {e 1 , e 2 } = {1, 1} a Nash equilibrium, yet the principal may wish to make both managers exerting effort the unique Nash equilibrium. There exists a literature on implementation of a unique Nash equilibrium, albeit the literature relies on increasing the message space. 11 The following proposition, however, demonstrates that whenever the auction mechanism supports a Nash equilibrium in which both managers exert effort, that equilibrium is unique.
Proposition 6 If both managers exerting effort is a Nash equilibrium (c ≥ĉ), then both managers exerting effort is the unique Nash equilibrium.
Proof: Examine the difference N 2(β, c, ν) = s(1, 0) − s(0, 0). Label the difference N 2(β, v, ν). We 10 For a simple example where moral hazard followed by adverse selection calls for a first-best production schedule, see Laffont and Martimort (2002) p296-298. 11 See, for example, Ma (1988) and Moore and Repullo (1990) .
have:
N 2(β, c, ν) = 1 60β 2 10β 2 − 3β 3 + (1 − c) 4 (11 + 4c) + 2β(c − 1) 3 (9 + 7c + 4c 2 ) − ν
To show that if e 1 = e 2 = 1 is a Nash equilibrium, then it is the unique Nash, it is sufficient to show that N (β, c, ν) ≥ 0 ⇒ N 2(β, c, ν) ≥ 0. To demonstrate this, we will show that N 2(β, c, ν) ≥ N (β, c, ν) by proving that their difference is always non-negative. To this end, we have:
N D(β, c, ν) = N 2(β, c, ν) − N (β, c, ν) = β 3 + (1 − c) 4 (3 + 2c) − 2β(1 − c) 3 (2c 2 + 2 + c) 30β 2 .
We first show that both N D(β, 0, ν) and N D(β, 1, ν) are non-negative. We have:
The sign of (28) 
The expression inside the sign function in (29) has two zeroes: β = 0, 1/2. Moreover, for β = 1/4 and β = 3/4, the expression is positive, hence (29) is non-negative on the entire interval
The proposition shows that if both managers exert effort in a Nash equilibrium, then that equilibrium must be the unique Nash equilibrium. To illustrate, consider our earlier example where B = 3/2 and β = 1/2. In order for effort to be a unique Nash equilibrium choice for both managers, from the proposition, the principal must ensure that exerting effort is a dominant strategy. We have already shown that exerting effort is a best response to the other manager exerting effort. Hence, we assess whether exerting effort is also a best response to the other manager not exerting effort.
A manager who exerts effort while his peer does not expects to earn a surplus of The difference, which is approximately 0.10396, is positive which, consistent with the Proposition, implies that exerting effort is a dominant strategy.
Conclusion
In this paper we address the issue of allocating resources within a firm in which two managers are hired to implement two independent projects. Each manager's cost to complete his project is a random variable and each manager privately observes his cost after being hired. The firm must allocate a resource to just one manager, which reduces that manager's cost of completing the project. The standard approach to this type of problem in the economics and accounting literature since the work of Harris et al. (1982) and Myerson (1981) has been to formulate the problem as a revelation game and employ a direct revelation mechanism. Direct mechanisms are generally complex and, as a result, are likely to be costly to implement. Noting that simple auctions are easy to implement and that they have been shown to be highly efficient in allocating resources within an economy, we examine whether a simple auction mechanism can be exploited to efficiently allocate the resource within the firm.
We highlight that a major difference between an auction in an economy and within a firm is that in the former, the valuations of the participants are (typically) exogenously given, whereas in the latter they are endogenously determined through contractual incentives established by one of the parties, the principal. Accordingly, our analysis weaves the auction mechanism with a simple contractual mechanism. We show that the difference between implementing an auction in an economy and a firm results in different optimal bidding strategies: in economies, the bidding strategies are monotonic in the underlying types of the participants whereas within firms, the bidding strategies may be non-monotonic. This difference implies that, within a firm, while the manager with the highest endogenous value for the resource always wins the resource, he is not always the manager whom the principal wishes to receive the resource. Not surprisingly, we find that this source of inefficiency causes the auction mechanism to fall short of the first-best. We also identify necessary and sufficient conditions for our auction mechanism to attain second-best efficiency. Finally, we extend the primary model to study the auction mechanism in a setting where each manager affects the distribution of his cost realization through the expenditure of effort, where the effort is subject to moral hazard. In this extension, we identify when the additional moral hazard problem is resolved at no incremental cost to the principal.
As the paper stands, we have not solved for the optimal second-best revelation mechanism when the managers also face a moral hazard problem. As such, we do not have a benchmark to compare our auction mechanism's efficiency in that setting. It would be interesting to see how our auction mechanism would perform relative to the second-best mechanism when the latter is used to solve both the private information and hidden action problems. We have also constrained the moral hazard problem of Section 4 to a binary task with a specialized distributional outcome. Although we do not anticipate any change in our results, a more thorough study could examine the robustness of our results in the face of a more generalized moral hazard problem.
